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Faithful and Disappointing: Reflections on the Idea of the Idola 
James Corby 
University of Malta 
 
In these images—if indeed that is what they are—there is perhaps everything. Life, death, 
culture, science, truth, falsity, certainly; but more than all of this, one might decipher what 
has portentously been called ‘the whole that acts in every instant and every phenomenon’.1 
We begin with the particulars, as indeed we must, in the no doubt forlorn hope of saying 
everything.
2
 
 
What we see, without ever really seeing, without ever being in a position to say ‘I see’ in a 
way that attends to the formation of an idea, a seeing, in other words, that is conditional 
upon a certain blindness, are photographs that have been manipulated into composite 
images that distort and disfigure.
3
 ‘But o, photography! as no art is | Faithful and 
disappointing’, we might say, quoting Philip Larkin’s reaction upon looking through a 
young lady’s photograph album.4 But the implications of this claim might be more 
complex than they first appear. Is it ‘photography is faithful and disappointing as no other 
art is’? Or is it ‘Photography is faithful and disappointing and thus no art is, i.e. is not art’? 
In truth, there is little to choose between photography as art’s exception and photography 
as non-art; and, in the end, perhaps it is wisest simply to agree with Roland Barthes’ 
judgement that ‘Photography is an uncertain art’.5 In any case, quoting Barthes again, the 
photograph ‘is never transcended for the sake of something else: the Photograph always 
leads the corpus I need back to the body I see’.6 For Larkin, the photograph is ‘faithful and 
disappointing’ because it ‘records dull days as dull, and hold-it smiles as frauds’. 
Disappointing, then, because it is faithful, because of its fidelity, because of its truth, 
because the camera does not lie. The implicit Platonism of Larkin’s verse is that art is not 
disappointing—or at least not in the same way as photography—precisely because of its 
infidelity, its faithlessness, its falsity, its lies.  
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Let us immediately establish some critical distance from this easy oppositionality between 
art and photography by briefly noting some of the ways these photographic images or idola 
that we have before us falsify and dissemble. Prominent in several of the images is a 
duck/rabbit-style illusion whereby a different image or idolum emerges as the result of an 
aspect shift in the viewer. This is immediately problematic for any theory of mimesis 
because it suggests that perception is not just a product of the particular external stimulus, 
but is also determined by mental activity. Can, then, photography be faithful? And to 
what? Let us bracket these questions for a moment and observe some of the perceptual 
play these images prompt. In the first image there is the unseeing idolum of Jorge Luis 
Borges, Tiresias-like but given a cyclopic oracular eye by Samuel Beckett. Somewhat 
amusingly, Borges seems to be smoking Beckett’s cigarette. Jacques Derrida quizzically 
looks on.  In the second picture, set against the gaze of Maurice Blanchot and the far-away 
look of Cormac McCarthy, who is staring, perhaps, into the outer dark, Alain Badiou 
appears transformed into Walter Benjamin—a violence neither of them could have 
foreseen. In the third idolum, Julian Barnes peers through spectacles of T.S. Eliot and 
Philip Larkin. Hélène Cixous presides over the fourth idolum as a Jewish Nefertiti, but 
what we realise, for the first time and with a sudden pang of delight, is that her hairstyle is 
Joycean—Cixous styles her hair after Joyce, so that from one angle Joyce in this idolum 
appears to have a peculiarly elongated head. Joyce and Cixous stare downwards, Joyce 
scholarly and confident, Cixous imperious; Kristeva, on the other hand, looks outward, 
anxious, beseeching, and with an earnestness that is cruelly and comically undercut by 
Joyce’s tie, which seems to loll from her mouth like a grotesque tongue. More cruelty 
follows in the apparently joyous fifth idolum. Is there secrecy, perfidy and victimisation 
here or does the idolum lie? It seems mad—sheer lunacy—but is not Michel Foucault 
cupping his ear to encourage Edward Said to say something that can’t quite be said, that 
Said cannot quite bring himself to say, about Judith Butler? Butler, with Christ-like 
compassion, sees, accepts and forgives this betrayal—it is not grievable…forgive them, 
mother, for they know not what they do, we might imagine her saying in the midst of this 
tableau. In the sixth picture a rather dejected Virginia Woolf, not quite of this world, looks 
sadly through her right eye, but more hopefully through a left eye lent to her by Toni 
Morrison. And is it a trick of the light, or does Salman Rushdie have the shadow of a 
Chaplinesque moustache, making him look decidedly more impish than usual? These are 
the various puncta that pierce (or ‘lacerate’, a word used by both Barthes and Larkin about 
photography) the studium, the field of the visual. 
 
Then we remember: an idolum is more than just an image. The word can also signify an 
unsubstantial appearance, a spectre or a phantom, a false mental image or a fallacy—
something Francis Bacon had much to say about.
7
 Idola, then, are untrue, deceptive—
anything but faithful one might say. But that would be to move too quickly. Might an act, 
performance or depiction of deception and dissemblance not be regarded as faithful or true  
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 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
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to something? When a liar lies, is he not being true to himself? Surely, that to which the 
idolum must be faithful determines the nature of that fidelity? In some cases, accurate 
mimicry or imitation might be more appropriate. That would assume a relatively stable 
referent and hermeneutic clarity. Might a different set of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions not call for a different sort of fidelity? Barthes remarks that ‘the Photograph is 
never anything but an antiphon of “Look,” “See,” “Here it is”; it points its finger at a 
certain vis-à-vis, and cannot escape this pure deictic language’.8 What Barthes means is 
that ‘a specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from what it 
represents), or at least it is not immediately or generally distinguished from its referent’.9 
In light of the idola reproduced here, we might say that this simply is not true. Here, the 
representation and the referent seem distinct. But are they? Might this not be to mistake the 
referent? There is, certainly, still the same photographic sense of immediacy, but with one 
notable and constitutive difference. Rather than being antiphonal of ‘Look, See, Here it is’, 
the idola seem to say ‘Look, See, Here it ISN’T’. Is there, then, a fidelity in these idola to a 
certain opacity, an invisibility, a faithfulness to impossibility? Not ‘faithful and 
disappointing’, but ‘faithful because disappointing’? In this sense they would not be 
considered false—misleading images, masking the truth, that is. Rather, these idola would 
be eide—or ideas—in their own right. Here I am using eidos or idea in the technical 
philosophical sense meaning ‘the presentation to itself of being or the thing’,10 the sense 
Hegel had in mind when, famously, he defined art as the sensuous manifestation of the 
idea. Martin Heidegger, fittingly, comments that ‘eidos resonates with what we mean when 
we say that a thing has a face, a visage, that it has the right look, that it stands’.11 These 
idola, then, would, in the spirit of Hegel’s aesthetics, be spectral visages that transgress—
and in doing so, undermine—the traditional distinction between the image and the idea, 
between the aesthetic and the intellectual, between poiesis or pictura and philosophy, 
between mythos and logos. 
 
Disappointing, then, not because these images show things as we might find them 
concretely in the world, but because this is precisely the photographic duty on which they 
renege. But, in a further dialectical torsion, it is because they are disappointing in this 
way—because they are unfaithful to the myth of the given, to co-opt Wilfrid Sellars’ 
phrase—that they are faithful to something else, to a different order, to something that 
resists direct representation. Again, then, ‘faithful because disappointing’. In this sense it is 
the realisation that a belief in direct, unproblematic access to things is in fact false and acts 
to distance us from the thing we seek by presenting us with the illusion of proximity, the 
illusion of immediacy. This idea is in itself not remarkable, however. It is there in 
everything from Romantic, to psychoanalytic, to poststructuralist thinking, to name but a 
few obvious manifestations of this realisation. In the humanities’ linguistic turn in the  
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twentieth century, that which distances us is language, and that from which we are 
distanced is a totalising conception of the operation of language itself, unconditioned by 
our use of it and, for that matter, its use of us. There might not be any ‘outside-text’ (il n’y 
a pas de hors-texte), but what is denied us, as textual beings, is the exposure of that 
textuality beyond a subjective textual node.
12
 Even though poststructuralism implies the 
mutual collapse of the subject and ontology into one another, there remains a non-
coincidence between thought (that is, language, the operation of textuality in the 
individual, textuality configured as an individual) and being (that is, the constantly 
drifting, changing textuality viewed, impossibly, from nowhere—textuality risen to a sort 
of Hegelian Geist-like self-knowledge). The finite poststructural individual, always already 
mediated by the web of signifying a processes out of which it emerges, is called to act and 
is motivated by the play of textuality that, ultimately, is beyond it, conditioning it. It is this 
aspect of textuality that, because of its transcendental opacity, we might perhaps call 
counter-textual, where ‘counter’ connotes both proximity and opposition. The 
countertextual, then, could be understood, to use Wallace Stevens’ phrase, as being both 
‘beyond us, yet ourselves’.13 It cannot be called to account (logos)—it resists 
demonstration and verification—and the more we try to pin it down the more it flees our 
grasp. 
 
The notion of the absolute in early German Romanticism, différance in Derrida, the night 
that is other in Blanchot, khôra in Kristeva and Derrida, as well as the unconscious and the 
real in the schemas of many writers and thinkers, might all be considered attempts to 
render minimally the countertextual. The common characteristic which confirms them as 
such is that they cannot be presented, articulated, or brought to light in any way without 
severe distortion; and yet they are believed to underpin and make possible the very 
discursivity they resist. The countertextual is ‘the indemonstrable, on which all 
demonstration depends’, to borrow J. G. Fichte’s phrase.14 Its status is, therefore, one 
might say, strictly speaking mythical. And, unsurprisingly, it provokes desire. The story of 
modern literature, philosophy, and the arts more generally, might plausibly be retold as a 
series of attempts to encounter, albeit fleetingly, in an experience entirely impossible, the 
countertextual, that which stands over and against meaning as the inarticulable condition 
of signification. But, learning the lesson of the idola, a straightforward, logically discursive 
account would be inimical to the mythical countertextual, and so it must be approached 
awry. Our desire to possess, to have it made present for us, must, paradoxically, be self-
denying, if we are to move towards it. It will no doubt be obvious that part of the power of 
this myth can be attributed to the fact that it is, at least structurally, a retelling of that 
archetypal myth of self-denying desire channelled into art, the tale of Orpheus, in which,  
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 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The 
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as we know, Orpheus can only approach Eurydice indirectly, by means of his song. This 
allows us to draw out one of the most remarkable things about these idola, and it clusters 
around two closely related observations. 
 
First, that which is countertextual—which, with a little more explanation we might call the 
absolute or the real—retains its power as such only to the extent that it is transformed into 
myth, which one might reasonably consider to be its opposite. The irony is that the real, 
the true, that to which the idola are faithful, belongs to the falsity of myth, not to 
demonstrable fact or logos. We think of myths as stories, but if the mythical countertextual 
is a story at all, it is the story of the impossibility of its telling. 
 
And this leads to the second observation, which is that arguably the only myth in a 
position of dominance in theory today is one that remains inexistent (a term often 
associated with Alain Badiou, which he came to modify to inexistant in tribute to 
Derrida).
15
 It is the myth of the impossibility of a story, a telling, a naming—the myth of 
the impossibility of myth, one might say. And as these idola might be considered 
testimony to the impossibility of photography, they too might be thought of as 
countertextual. The very falsity of idola, then, is true—not in the sense that they are truly 
false, but because truth is located in their falsity, in their dissemblance, a dissemblance that 
undermines the possibility of there being such a thing as true resemblance. Once more, 
then, faithful because disappointing. Eidos because idola, logos because mythos. 
 
But even this is not to say everything. What, for instance, of the idols themselves? Beckett, 
Borges, Derrida, Blanchot, McCarthy etc. Some of the great and good of modern letters. If 
Barthes was right (and Seán Burke was wrong) and the author is indeed dead, then what 
we are looking at are ghosts of the literary and theoretical canon. Idols as in idola, then, as 
in phantoms or spectres. Fictitious false gods. As St Paul puts it in the first epistle to the 
Corinthians, ‘an idol is nothing in the world’. And the more dead they are, the more 
spectral, the less they are in the world—even if living—the greater the amount of idolatry 
they inspire. Barthes, then, was no idoloclast. Death idolises. Ironically, Barthes observes 
the same process in photography—photography translates something into an image, it has 
the power to transform a subject into an object. ‘Death is the eidos of [the] Photograph’, 
writes Barthes.
16
 When my photograph is taken, he writes, and ‘I discover myself in the 
product of this operation, what I see is that I have become Total-Image, which is to say, 
Death in person’.17 Death idolises, photography murders, negating subjectivity in the 
production of an object (an idol is nothing in the world). Thus, subjectivity, or ‘private 
life’ as Barthes puts it, ‘is nothing but that zone of space, of time, where I am not an  
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image, an object’.18 But does this hold true for the false idola? Perhaps not. Perhaps these 
idolum montages de-idolise, restoring subjectivity, enlivening dead letters. We are 
speaking of nothing less than the possibility of deliverance. These idola take not authors 
but authorities, not creators but logos, representatives of presence, cornerstones of 
canonicity. In other words, they take objects, not subjects, and transform them into 
something not fully present, not fully objective. They restore a sort of indeterminate 
subjectivity, disclosing that which refuses to come forth, that which refuses to be named, 
the spectral that animates literature--the countertextual, one might say. These photographs, 
these idola, then, are living, not dead, or rather, echoing Blanchot echoing Hegel, they 
endure death and maintain themselves in it.
19
 They open up within the image a space in 
which something more than the image exists, a space in which the image is, strictly 
speaking, inexistent. As such, they partake in what Simon Critchley refers to as ‘the 
creation of new forms of life at a distance from the order of the state—which is the order 
of visibility’.20 Idola, true and false, poetic, philosophical and scientific, would then claim 
as their domain the space of the political, the space, indeed, of life itself. The space, we 
might say, of everything.  
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